A renewed commitment at the regional and the global levels led to substantial progress in the fight for polio eradication in the African Region (AFR) of the World Health Organization (WHO) during -2012 there were 912 reported cases of wild poliovirus (WPV) infection in 12 countries in the region. This number had been reduced to 128 cases in 3 countries in 2012, of which 122 were in Nigeria, the only remaining country with endemic circulation of WPV in AFR. During 2008-2012, circulation apparently ceased in the 3 AFR countries with reestablished WPV transmission-Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Chad. Outbreaks in West Africa continued to occur in 2008-2010 but were more rapidly contained, with fewer cases than during earlier years. This progress has been attributed to better implementation of core strategies, increased accountability, and implementation of innovative approaches. During this period, routine coverage with 3 doses of oral polio vaccine in AFR, as measured by WHO-United Nations Children's Fund estimates, increased slightly, from 72% to 74%. Despite this progress, challenges persist in AFR, and 2013 was marked by new setbacks and importations. High population immunity and strong surveillance are essential to sustain progress and assure that AFR reaches its goal of eradicating WPV.
The World Health Assembly (WHA) launched the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) in 1988 [1] , and most countries in the World Health Organization (WHO) African Region (AFR) began polio eradication activities in 1995 [2] . The 4 cornerstone strategies of the GPEI have been routine immunization with poliocontaining vaccines; supplementary immunization activities (SIAs) with oral polio vaccine (OPV) as needed to ensure population immunity; strong surveillance for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP); and targeted mop-up campaigns [3] . These strategies resulted in early success, with the number of polio-endemic AFR countries decreasing from 30 in 1998 to only 1 (Nigeria) in 2006.
However, significant reversals tarnished progress after 2003. Rumors that OPV resulted in sterility led to suspension of immunization efforts in late 2003 in Kano, a state in northern Nigeria, where WPV was still endemic. During a 10-month ban, WPV spread to 12 countries, and by 2006 WPV originating in Nigeria had reinfected 20 previously polio-free countries as far away as Indonesia and Yemen and resulted in 1475 cases of paralytic polio [4, 5] . Transmission of WPV of Nigerian origin became reestablished (defined as sustained transmission for ≥12 months following importation) in Chad (WPV type 1 [WPV1] and WPV type 3 [WPV3]) and in Sudan (WPV1; because Sudan was a member state of the WHO Eastern Mediterranean Region during 2008-2012, and because South Sudan and Sudan formally separated in 2012, with South Sudan joining AFR in 2013, Sudan is not included in any aggregate or summary discussion of AFR in this report). WPV1 and WPV3 of Indian origin became reestablished in Angola after repeated importations in 2005, 2007, and 2008 , and WPV1 subsequently spread to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where transmission became reestablished [6, 7] . WPV1 from Angola also caused an outbreak among adults in Namibia in 2006 after >10 years without detection of poliovirus circulation [8] . By the end of 2007, control efforts had stopped transmission of imported WPV1 in all AFR countries except Angola, Chad, the DRC and Niger. However, the program suffered new setbacks in 2008 with another wave of importations.
Concerned that forward momentum in polio eradication efforts had stagnated, the WHA called for a new eradication strategy in 2008, resulting in the 2009 Programme of Work and the GPEI Strategic Plan 2010-2012 [5, 9] . Concern about the progress of polio eradication also became evident at the political level; the WHO Regional Committee for Africa issued resolution AFR/RC61/R4 in August 2011, declaring polio a public health emergency, and the WHA declared polio a programmatic emergency for global public health in May 2012. The most recent GPEI strategic plan for 2013-2018 includes an endgame strategy for the eventual eradication of polio [10] . The objectives of the strategy include the cessation of all WPV transmission by the end of 2014 and cessation of new outbreaks due to circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV) within 120 days of confirmation of the index cases, strengthening immunization systems, and introduction of inactivated polio vaccine (IPV).
In the process of implementation of the GPEI 2010-2012 Strategic Plan and subsequent declarations of heightened urgency for polio eradication, many countries in AFR have implemented national emergency action plans, which call for enhanced government commitment and ownership of national polio eradication, increased accountability at all administrative levels, and improved partner coordination (eg, a polio emergency operations center in Nigeria). In addition to the cornerstone strategies, various innovative strategies were incorporated to increase population immunity and improve surveillance. Special cross-cutting innovative operational strategies were outlined in the 2010-2012 plan, including use of bivalent OPV (bOPV), use of lot quality assurance sampling (LQAS) to monitor SIA performance, special strategies to reach inaccessible populations and unvaccinated children, and enhanced AFP surveillance. Other strategies include vaccination of expanded target age groups in outbreak settings and the short-interval additional doses (SIAD) strategy to reach populations that are inaccessible or in security-compromised situations.
Overall, despite many challenges, AFR made huge strides toward polio eradication during [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] Despite these successes, profound challenges remain. AFR will continue to remain at risk for WPV circulation as long as immunization systems and AFP surveillance are suboptimal and endemic WPV circulation continues in Nigeria. This report will evaluate the performance of AFR during 2008-2012 with respect to the cornerstone polio eradication strategies (routine immunization services, SIAs, and disease surveillance), will review the possible impact of innovative strategies in the reduction of WPV cases in AFR, and will consider AFR's readiness to embrace the challenges of the latest strategic plan.
ROUTINE IMMUNIZATION SERVICES
All 46 countries in AFR during 2008-2012 had routine immunization (RI) schedules that used trivalent OPV (tOPV; South Africa, the only country in the region using IPV in the routine schedule during 2008-2012, introduced IPV nationwide in April 2009 as a component of an injectable pentavalent vaccine administered according to the EPI schedule, and OPV is administered at birth and together with the first IPV dose at 6 weeks [11] ). Estimated coverage with 3 doses of oral polio vaccine (OPV3) received during routine immunization increased for 28 countries in AFR during 2008-2012 (Table 1) , and WHOUnited Nations Children's Fund estimates for regional OPV3 coverage increased from 72% to 74% [13] . However, the goal set for AFR is to achieve and maintain routine immunization coverage for OPV3 of at least 90% at national level and 80% at district level [13] . This goal was achieved at the national level in <40% of the countries. Furthermore, while the overall coverage has shown improvement, the performance in some countries has declined ( Table 1) .
As part of the endgame strategy and to aid in the elimination of cVDPVs, countries in the region are preparing for the widespread introduction of at least 1 dose of IPV into the routine immunization schedule [10] , many with GAVI Alliance financing. The later withdrawal of tOPV in conjunction with the switch to bOPV, as foreseen in the endgame, will require strengthened immunization systems. The 2013-2018 Polio Endgame plan calls for targeted support for systems building in the countries considered to be at highest risk for repeated outbreaks and cVDPVs, including Nigeria, Angola, Chad, the DRC, Ethiopia, and South Sudan [10] .
SIA STRATEGIES AND QUALITY ASSURANCE
Countries in AFR have been using SIAs to supplement OPV administered during routine immunization to increase population immunity and accelerate the progress toward polio eradication. Strategies used consist of using national immunization days (NIDs) or subnational immunization days (SNIDs) in scheduled campaigns and use of mop-up activities in response to identified cases of WPV or cVDPV. During 2008-2012, SIAs were conducted in countries with circulating or recently circulating poliovirus and periodically as a preventive measure in countries considered to be at risk for poliovirus importation. The total number of OPV doses delivered for use in SIAs increased from 335 million in 2008 to 548 million in 2012; the peak number of doses was delivered in 2011 (771 million) in 96 NIDs and 110 SNIDs. During 2011 and 2012, bOPV increasingly replaced tOPV in SIAs to provide improved immunogenicity against WPV1 and WPV3. Summary information about the number and type of OPV doses supplied in SIA activities conducted in the region from 2008 to 2012 are shown in Table 2 .
SIA quality has been assessed through independent monitoring. However, the continued transmission of poliovirus is inconsistent with independent monitoring results, which often indicate very successful campaigns with high coverage. This, along with concern about household selection based on convenience sampling rather than purposive representative sampling, led to the introduction of LQAS methods as an alternate means to monitor campaign quality [14, 15] . LQAS is widely used in Nigeria, Angola, the DRC, and Chad. Unlike independent monitoring, LQAS uses random sampling (within selected districts), allowing for less biased estimates of campaign quality. LQAS is increasingly used to monitor campaign performance, promote accountability, and refine immunization strategies.
Various strategies were used to quickly boost population immunity with apparently good effect. Expanded age group campaigns, including older children or adults within target age groups, were conducted in response to outbreaks in the ROC, the Central African Republic, Kenya, and the DRC [16, 17] . In addition, the SIAD strategy was used in response to outbreaks in Kenya.
A dramatic improvement in overall OPV coverage from 2004 to 2012, either from routine immunization or through SIAs, is 
SURVEILLANCE
All countries in AFR use case-based AFP surveillance to detect acute paralytic illness and, thereby, the transmission of WPVs or VDPVs. Stool samples are collected from paralyzed children and sent through a reverse cold chain to country and regional laboratories in the Global Polio Laboratory Network (GPLN) for isolation of poliovirus and intratypic differentiation. The AFP surveillance network measures its performance against 2 global standard indicators: the NPAFP rate (goal: detection of at least 2 cases of NPAFP per 100 000 population aged <15 years) and the percentage of adequate stool specimens collected (goal: collection of at least 2 adequate stool specimens from at least 80% of reported AFP cases). The Standard WHO target is adequate stool specimen collection from ≥80% of AFP cases, in which two specimens are collected within 14 days of paralysis onset ≥24 hours apart, shipped on ice or frozen ice packs, and arriving in good condition in a WHO-accredited laboratory. Stool specimen adequacy proportions from AFR do not include the criteria of good specimen condition or time between specimens. In addition, 100% of stool specimens should be Table 2 are the number of doses supplied for NID and SNID activities, and may not represent the total number of doses administered. SNID activities include mop-up campaigns as well as scheduled subnational supplementary immunization activities. tested in a WHO-accredited GPLN laboratory. Each of the performance measures is bound by specific time measures for prompt diagnosis and response. During 2008-2012, the number of the 46 AFR countries in the region meeting the NPAFP goal increased from 37 to 40, and the number of countries meeting stool specimen adequacy proportions decreased slightly, from 40 to 39, as seen in Table 3 . Many of the smaller countries in AFR, such as the Seychelles and São Tomé and Principe, have difficulty consistently meeting the NPAFP indicator. Priority countries, including Nigeria, the DRC, Angola, and Chad, all had NPAFP rates exceeding the target rate. However, national level data mask variation and subregions of poor performance within countries.
Environmental surveillance for poliovirus in sewage or other samples from the local environment can supplement AFP surveillance and make it possible to detect circulation of wild poliovirus in areas where AFP cases are not detected [18] . By late 2012, environmental surveillance had been established in 3 states in Nigeria (Kano, Sokoto, and Lagos), with plans to expand to Kaduna, Borno, and the Federal Capital Territory. Plans are underway to further expand environmental surveillance within the region in preparation for certification; Kenya has recently implemented environmental surveillance and Angola is also slated for introduction.
EPIDEMIOLOGY OF WPV AND VDPV
The period 2008-2012 in AFR was characterized by reestablished WPV circulation in 3 previously polio-free nations (Angola, the DRC, and Chad) [4, [19] [20] [21] ; numerous importations of WPV1 and WPV3 into West Africa and the Horn of Africa countries [22, 23] ; a large outbreak of WPV1 in ROC during 2010-2011 [16, 17] ; the emergence of cVDPVs in the region [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] ; and ongoing transmission of WPV1, WPV3, and cVDPV type 2 (cVDPV2) in the region's only remaining country with endemic transmission, Nigeria [30] [31] [32] [33] . A great deal of progress was made by 2012 to reverse these trends (Figure 2 ) [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] , however, challenges remain.
In AFR, WPV circulation became reestablished in Angola, Chad, and the DRC, and these countries, along with Nigeria, were the source of repeated WPV importations into other countries during 2008-2012 [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] . WPV originating from Angola was imported into the DRC, as well the ROC, Burundi, and the Central African Republic. The last case of WPV infection in Angola occurred in July 2011. In the DRC, outbreaks of WPV1 and WPV3 were reported from 2006 to 2011; the last reported case of WPV infection occurred in December 2011 (Table 4) . At the end of 2012, Angola and the DRC were both classified as polio free. In Chad, WPV3 imported from Nigeria in 2007 became established, and subsequently WPV1 became reestablished following a 2010 importation from Nigeria. The last cases of WPV3 infection were reported in December 2011 and the most recent case of WPV1 infection was reported in May 2012.
In 2008, WPV1 and WPV3 were imported into previously polio-free countries in West Africa, the Horn of Africa, and south-central Africa [22, 23] . In 2009, WPV1 and WPV3 outbreaks occurred in 12 West African countries, with importation of virus of Nigerian origin; in 2 countries in the Horn of Africa, with virus from Sudan; and in Burundi, with virus from the DRC [23] . Of the 12 West Africa countries with 2009 outbreaks, 3 had continued cases in 2010. In 2010, new importations occurred in 4 West African countries, 1 Horn of Africa country, and 1 central African country. The latter importation resulted in a massive outbreak in the ROC, with 442 cases of WPV1 infection [16, 17] . In Kouilou and Pointe Noire, the case-fatality rate was 40% and the median patient age was 20 years. In 2011, importations occurred in 4 West African countries, 1 Horn of Africa country, and 3 central African countries [21] . In 2012, a single case of WPV1 infection in Niger was the only importation event in AFR. Table 4 shows laboratory-confirmed cases of WPV1, WPV3, and VDPV infection by country and year, and Figure 2 shows the year-by-year progression of cases of WPV1 and WPV3 infection. Nigeria, the only country in AFR that has not interrupted indigenous WPV transmission, had 798 confirmed WPV cases in 2008. Between late 2008 and 2010, Nigeria implemented intensified polio eradication activities with increased engagement and accountability of local political, traditional, and religious leaders in the remaining infected areas in northern states [31] . This resulted in significant increase in quality and coverage of polio eradication campaigns, and Nigeria reported only 21 confirmed polio cases due to WPV in 2010 [32] . Distractions as a result of national elections in 2011, complacency, and escalating insecurity in the highest-risk areas resulted in a reversal of these gains, and in 2012 Nigeria reported 122 polio cases due to WPV infection [33] . A Presidential Task Force on Polio Eradication was established in 2012 to enhance ownership and accountability of priority polio eradication activities at all levels. National and State Polio Eradication Emergency Operations Centers established to oversee the implementation of national polio emergency plans contributed to marked improvement in SIA quality in late 2012 and 2013.
Reported cVDPV infections peaked in 2009, with 163 total cases reported, of which 154 were cases of cVDPV2 infection from Nigeria (Table 4) . During 2008-2012, cVDPVs have been reported from at least 4 different countries every year, indicative of low tOPV coverage and poor routine immunization delivery [26] [27] [28] [29] . By 2012, only 38 cases of cVDPV infection were reported, possibly because of prompter implementation of outbreak response immunization activities. Eradication of cVDPVs is a key goal integrated in the endgame strategy through the introduction of IPV and removal of OPV2 from the routine immunization schedule [10] .
CONCLUSION
Despite outbreaks and ongoing transmission in Nigeria, AFR made a great deal of progress toward WPV eradication during 2008-2012. Table 5 shows the overall trend in key indicators for AFR. Furthermore, progress resulting from the renewed commitments in priority countries was sustained in 2013. By the end of 2013, Nigeria had 53 confirmed polio cases due to WPV infection, a 57% decrease, compared with the previous year, and no confirmed case of WPV3 infection since November 2012. No WPV cases were reported in 2013 from the previously reestablished transmission countries-Angola, the DRC, and Chad-nor from the countries in the West Africa importation belt. Despite this progress, challenges remain, as demonstrated by setbacks since 2012. In 2013, WPV linked virologically to virus circulating in Chad a year earlier was reported in Cameroon, indicating undetected circulation of WPV and gaps in surveillance. An outbreak of WPV1 of Nigerian origin from neighboring Somalia resulted in cases in Kenya and Ethiopia, indicating ongoing immunity gaps and vulnerability in AFR to WPV importation [34] . Cases of cVDPV2 infection were detected in Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, and Chad in 2013, indicating ongoing deficiencies in routine immunization.
Importations of WPV into polio-free countries in AFR will remain a threat as long as circulation continues in polioendemic countries [35] . High population immunity is essential to sustain progress and to ensure that AFR reaches its goal of eradicating WPV; this can be achieved through sustained high OPV coverage in the routine immunization program, highquality SIAs that consistently reach every child, and successful introduction of IPV in the routine vaccine schedule, in addition to prompt, aggressive, and sustained responses to all outbreaks. High-quality AFP surveillance is critical to rapidly detect any new cases. To date, certification and containment activities in AFR, which will be necessary to certify the region's poliofree status, have been minimal because of the priority placed on responding to WPV importations and other immediate responses [41] . With continued successes, AFR will focus attention on containment activities.
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